

Increasing cultural intelligence for military troops and civilian officers serving in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)

Furqan Abdul Rais Zordi^{1*}, Siswo Hadi Sumantri², M. Adnan Madjid³

^{1,2,3} Indonesia Defense University, Indonesia

*Corresponding author E-mail: furqan.abdul.r.z@gmail.com

Received: Oct. 23, 2022.

Revised: Nov. 1, 2022

Accepted: Nov. 2, 2022

Online: Nov. 6, 2022

Abstract

the Democratic Republic of the Congo is still experiencing internal political turmoil between the Tutsi and Hutu tribes. Therefore, the United Nations through the Security Council established The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) to monitor the peace process after the Second Congo War. Several approaches must be applied so that the mission carried out is able to reconcile the conflicting actors. The purpose of this research is to find out the obstacles faced in the MONUSCO mission and their solutions. The method used in this research is to use a literature study and to test the credibility of the data found. The peace mission carried out by MONUSCO can be said to be quite successful despite facing several strategic and operational challenges. The use of cultural intelligence and prospect theory in pre-mission training should be done in order to increase the success of the mission.

© The Author 2022.
Published by ARDA.

Keywords: Peacekeeping, Cultural Intelligence, Prospect Theory, MONUSCO, Democratic Republic of The Congo

1. Introduction

The Congo conflict was caused by the protracted conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Before the conflict occurred, there were two wars that caused further conflict, namely the First Congo War (Africa's First World War) and the Second Congo War (Great War of Africa). This war was a civil war as well as an international military conflict that took place in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, formerly known as Zaire. The beginning of the conflict was caused by a severe economic downturn in 1996 and longstanding inter-tribal disputes under President Mobutu Sese who was a dictator [1]. In addition, the unstable conditions on the eastern border which were affected by the Rwandan Genocide also contributed to the escalation of conflicts that occurred in the country. President Mobutu Sese's deteriorating health condition also caused the government's authority to almost collapse. This put the militias, rebels, and soldiers at odds with each other [2].

Ethnic tensions have existed for generations in Zaire, especially in the east. These tensions occurred mainly between the indigenous Agrarian Tribe of Zaire, the Hutu and the Tutsi who settled semi-nomadic and had emigrated from Rwanda. The Tutsis who emigrated to Zaire before Congo's Independence in 1960 are known

as Banyamulenge and have citizenship rights under Zairian law. While the Tutsis who emigrated to Zaire after 1960 are called Banyarwanda, although the natives often do not distinguish these differences, they still refer to Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda as foreigners [3]. Banyamulenge launched a rebellion aimed at seizing power in the province of Kivu in the eastern part of the country of Zaire. The rebellion was an anticipatory measure to combat Hutu extremist forces who were trying to continue the genocide in Zaire. President Mobutu Sese's harsh policies in dealing with rebellions made him a common enemy at all levels of society. As a result, the new uprising gained massive public support and grew into a general revolution and not just an uprising promoted by Banyamulenge. The rebellious militias belonged to the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) [4]. The culmination of this war was the occupation of the capital city of Kinshasa by the AFDL assisted by foreign militaries from Uganda, Rwanda, and Eritrea and the overthrow of President Mobutu Sese. Furthermore, the power was held by the leader of the AFDL, namely Laurent-Désiré Kabila. He later changed the name Zaire to the Democratic Republic of Congo [2].

The Democratic Republic of the Congo led by Kabila shows the similarity in the method of government, this is evident where the social and economic conditions in the country have a higher and more severe level of corruption compared to the era of President Mobutu Sese's leadership. The economy remained in a state of disrepair and worsened under the Kabila Government. On the other hand, Kabila started an intense campaign of centralization of government that gave rise to new conflicts with minority groups in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo who demanded special autonomy [5]. President Kabila's leadership is also seen as a "puppet" of foreign governments. In order to dispel this image, he began to fight against his allies from abroad during the First Congo War. The culmination of this event was the expulsion of all foreign troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 26 July 1998 [6]. This incident had an impact on the internal political conditions in the country. On August 2, 1998, Banyamulenge in Goma formed a rebel group called Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) and fought against President Kabila. RCD itself is also supported by Rwanda and Uganda [7]. On the other hand, the government of President Kabila was supported by Namibia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Chan, Libya and Sudan [8].

In 2001, President Kabula was shot and killed by Rashide Mizele who was his personal bodyguard. In order to fill power, Joseph Kabila was appointed President by the Congo Parliament replacing his father [9] [9]. This war ended with a peace agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda on July 30, 2002 in the Pretoria Accord [10] and between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda on September 6, 2002 in the Luanda Agreement [11]. Although it has entered a period of peace with its neighbors, the Democratic Republic of the Congo is still experiencing internal political turmoil between the Tutsi and Hutu tribes. Therefore, the United Nations through the Security Council established The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) to monitor the peace process after the Second Congo War. In order to increase the success of the Peacekeeping mission carried out by MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, several approaches must be applied so that the mission carried out is able to reconcile the conflicting actors. Therefore, the authors recommend training and coaching regarding the application of Cultural Intelligence and Prospect Theory to peacekeepers serving in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

2. Research method

This study uses a documentation study which is defined as a data collection technique by studying documents to obtain data or information related to the problem under study [12]. The data collection technique is done by means of literature study. Literature study is a study carried out using literature (library), either in the form of books, notes, or reports on research results from previous researchers [13]. Collecting data through library research is done by looking for sources from textbooks, articles, journals, electronic media, magazines and other related sources. Credibility testing is carried out by extending observations, increasing persistence, triangulation, negative case analysis, using reference materials, and member checks in order to obtain the

degree of accuracy of the research design with the results to be achieved [12]. In addition, this study also uses several theories, which are described below:

2.1. Cultural Intelligence

Cultural intelligence is defined as a person's ability to function effectively and in diverse cultural conditions. Cultural Intelligence is a multidimensional construct that is intended to be used in situations where cross-cultural interactions are required due to differences in race, ethnicity, and nationality [14]. Cultural intelligence is also a personality that can be developed (state-like personality) and not a personality that is stable and cannot be changed (trait-like personality). In order to measure a person's cultural intelligence, several measurements are needed based on four indicators, namely [15]:

- **Metacognitive Intelligence (Metacognitive CQ)**
Metacognitive CQ shows a person's mental processes in obtaining and understanding cultural knowledge, including knowledge about control over individual thinking processes related to culture [16]. Skills related to Metacognitive Intelligence are the ability to plan, monitor, and revise mental models of personal cultural norms in order to adapt to a country or group of people. Individuals who have high metacognitive intelligence are instinctively aware of the cultural preferences of others before and during interacting with them. Individuals who have high metacognitive intelligence also question the cultural assumptions of a region and adapt them to their mental models during and after interactions [17].
- **Cognitive Intelligence (Cognitive CQ)**
Cognitive intelligence shows a person's knowledge of norms, practices, and conventions in different cultures and is obtained from education and personal experience. Individuals who have high Cognitive Intelligence are able to understand the similarities and differences across cultures [17].
- **Motivational Intelligence (Motivational CQ)**
Motivational intelligence is the ability to direct attention and personal energy to learn and contribute in conditions that are rich in cultural differences. Individuals who have high motivational intelligence are able to direct their attention and personal energy to cross-cultural conditions based on intrinsic interest [18] and belief in their cross-cultural effectiveness [19].
- **Behavioral Intelligence (Behavioural CQ)**
Behavioral intelligence is intelligence that shows a person's ability to show appropriate verbal and nonverbal actions when interacting with people from different cultures. Individuals with high behavioral intelligence are able to show behavior that is in accordance with conditions based on their verbal and nonverbal abilities [20].

2.2. Prospect Theory

Prospect Theory is a psychological theory that describes how a person's actions in assessing their advantages and disadvantages in an asymmetrical condition [21]. Prospect Theory begins with the concept of loss aversion which is an asymmetric form of risk aversion. The results of research observations show that people will react differently when faced with potential losses and potential gains. This is based on certain situations when potential losses and potential gains are faced by them. The act of selecting the existing potential is called reference dependence which can be explained as follows: (1) when a person is faced with a risky choice that leads to a potential profit, they tend to avoid risk by choosing an option that has a smaller return but has a higher level of certainty of profit. tall; (2) if faced with risky choices that lead to potential losses, they tend to take risks by preferring options that have lower returns as long as those choices have the potential to avoid losses.

3. Results and discussion

3.1. Obstacles in the MONUSCO mission

The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) is a United Nations peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

created by the United Nations Security Council in resolutions 1279 (1999) and 1291 (2000) to monitor the Second Congo War peace process. However, the focus of the mission being carried out shifted to dealing with the Ituri Conflict, the Kivu Conflict and the Dongo Conflict. Prior to the issuance of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1291, UNSCR resolution 1258 (1999) was issued with the initial aim of being a military observer in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to observe and report on the compliance of factions in reaching a peace agreement [22]. At this time, UNSCR resolution 2612 (2021) is the basis used by the United Nations to authorize MONUSCO to carry out peace missions in the area [23].

At the start of implementing the measures to end the mission in the DRC, it is very important to carry out an impact assessment of the MONUSCO activities. In carrying out such impact assessments, observers may have to change the point of view used in assessing UN peacekeeping actions. It should also be acknowledged that peacekeeping missions are only provided with funding sources in locations that do not have high priority and have limited strategic importance. Most missions have accomplished much and assisted the international community in monitoring and preventing conflicts from escalating to massive levels of violence. Given the relatively few resources allocated to large areas, the achievements of MONUSCO have been impressive. Peacekeeping missions do their best to carry out mandates that are often unrealistic or overly ambitious, and measuring their effectiveness should also involve examining the reality of implementing the mandates presented by the Security Council against the means and capabilities at hand [24].

Some of the strategic impacts of the PPB peacekeeping mission in the DRC can be traced from the mission carried out by the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), which was the predecessor to MONUSCO. One of them is the success of the mission in the reunification of the country. Which if the peacekeeping mission is not carried out properly, it is likely that the DRC will not exist in its current form. In addition, MONUC/MONUSCO also has a strategic impact in preventing the recurrence of major violent conflicts by using its presence to enable international, national and private sector actors to provide services to the community as well as to stimulate local economies and support democratic politics. The role of MONUC/MONUSCO is also very important in monitoring, reporting, collecting and sharing information related to human rights violations in support of international criminal justice and the fight against impunity [24].

On the other hand, the mission carried out by MONUSCO encountered several strategic obstacles, namely: (1) the decreasing level of cooperation between the UN forces and the DRC; (2) the role of neighboring countries in triggering instability; and (3) the absence of a winner for MONUC and MONUSCO on the Security Council to utilize a mutually agreed blueprint for comprehensively addressing conflict. The mission also faced a number of operational obstacles, namely (1): operational and tactical challenges due to not having adequate facilities and capacity to carry out the mission; (2) the contingent of peacekeepers who do not want to carry out the mandate given; (3) lack of effective leadership and pre-mission training; (4) the problem of multiple interpretations of what peacekeeping and mission mandates are; (5) lack of strategic communication strategies to reduce misunderstandings and to explain the mandate and mission to the DRC community or even internally [24].

The rejection of the MONUSCO mission was also voiced by the local community, for almost 25 years, the United Nations has continued to renew the mandate of the MONUSCO mission in DRC, but from year to year the situation is getting worse [25]. Anti-UN protests have occurred in recent years. However, the demonstrations that took place in August 2022 were large-scale demonstrations. Peacekeepers shoot dead civilians. The demonstration that took place claimed 36 lives, four of whom were peacekeepers. The demonstrations come amid an insurgency by the M23 armed group that has seized swathes of territory in the eastern province of North Kivu. Protesters say MONUSCO has been slow and has failed to acknowledge Rwanda's alleged support for the group. Most residents in North Kivu Province and Ituri Province want the 12,000 MONUSCO peacekeepers to leave the DRC immediately [26]. MONUSCO came to protect the people

of DRC, but there was only a feeling of insecurity. Therefore, MONUSCO has failed in its main mission to protect civilians [27].

3.2. Applications of Cultural Intelligence and Prospect Theory in Peacekeeping

The use of Cultural Intelligence in peacekeeping is able to provide a framework for improvement of the design and implementation of cross-cultural activities. In addition, the end of the Cold War forced modern military forces to be able to carry out peacekeeping operations as part of a coalition of international cooperation. It is also possible that the commando team on the ground consists of troops with diverse cultural backgrounds. Therefore, the application of cultural intelligence is very important to be applied to peacekeepers in order to prepare cross-cultural leadership competencies. Several ways that can be done to improve cross-cultural leadership competence can be described below [28].

- Modified cognitive behavioral techniques (personal reflection, planning and monitoring skills) can be used to train metacognitive intelligence.
- Training on traditional cultural awareness (specific knowledge about the destination country) can be used to increase cognitive intelligence.
- Goal setting and goal setting techniques can be used to increase motivational intelligence
- Dramaturgy approach by way of role playing, performance, and visual arts can be used to train and improve behavioral intelligence.

An example of the use of cultural intelligence and prospect theory can be seen in the success of the Garuda XII contingent that is part of the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in Cambodia. The program run by the Garuda Contingent emphasizes building a common identity and minimizing differences between local residents. The openness of the Indonesian military camp to the local population made it easier for the Garuda Contingent to mingle and discuss with local residents from all walks of life. In addition, the similarity of skin color and high patience greatly benefit them in approaching groups that are quite difficult to approach. The Garuda contingent always invites and includes local residents in the activities of Indonesian holidays, traditions and customs at the military camp. The Garuda Contingent's programs such as health and dental care, video broadcasts, sports activities, and village development projects where planning and implementation always involve local communities further increase their trust in the Garuda Contingent. The local communities who were involved in the Garuda Contingent's activities were both supporters and members of the conflicting actors. This made the Garuda Contingent able to carry out development programs in all areas including areas controlled by the Khmer Rouge where this situation could not be achieved by other peacekeepers serving in Cambodia [29].

The actions of the Garuda contingent that benefited all parties made the conflicting actors prefer to make peace with common interests. This is in accordance with the determination of reference dependence point 1 where when a person is faced with a risky choice that leads to potential benefits, they tend to avoid risk by choosing the option that has a smaller return but has a higher level of certainty of profit [21].

4. Conclusions

Although there are differences in social, political and economic conditions between Cambodia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, there are similarities in conflict between the two countries where the conflicting actors have different cultural backgrounds. By placing troops that have high cultural intelligence, the Garuda XII Contingent is able to increase the percentage of program success that is higher than peacekeepers from other countries. In addition, by giving benefits to all warring parties, the warring actors in the conflict in Cambodia decided to make peace. This has proven to be able to restore the stability of social, political and economic conditions in the country. Although there has been no research that examines the success of applying cultural intelligence to peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

the success achieved by the Garuda XII Contingent on peace missions in Cambodia should be applied in order to achieve conflict resolution that is accepted by all warring parties in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they have no any known financial or non-financial competing interests in any material discussed in this paper.

Funding information

No funding was received from any financial organization to conduct this research.

Acknowledgements

Thanks are addressed to Rear Admiral TNI (Ret.) Dr. Siswo Hadi Sumantri., ST., M.MT., M.Tr.Opsla., CIQnR., CIQaR., IPU and TNI First Admiral (Ret.) Dr. M. Adnan Madjid, SH., M. Hum. as a research supervisor while studying at the Peace and Conflict Resolution Study Program, Faculty of National Security, Indonesia Defense University.

References

- [1] A. Abbott, "The Problem of Excess," *Sociological Theory*, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 1-26, 18 March 2014.
- [2] G. Prunier, "Rebel movements and proxy warfare: Uganda, Sudan and the Congo (1986–99)," *African Affairs*, vol. 103, no. 412, pp. 359-383, July 2004.
- [3] R. Lemarchand, *The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012.
- [4] J. Pomfret, "Rwandans Led Revolt in Congo," 9 Juli 1997. [Online]. Available: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1997/07/09/rwandans-led-revolt-in-congo/7d210372-e307-4222-a04b-a65cd816be5f/>.
- [5] I. W. Zartman and C. Arnson, "The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Structures of Greed, Networks of Need,," in *Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed*, Washington, D.C., Woodrow Wilson Center, 2005, p. 154.
- [6] K. Vlassenroot, "Citizenship, Identity Formation & Conflict in South Kivu: The Case of the Banyamulenge," *Review of African Political Economy*, vol. 29, no. 93/94, pp. 499-515, 2002.
- [7] J. F. Clark, *The African Stakes of the Congo War*, New York: Springer, 2002.
- [8] L. Machipisa, "DISARMAMENT: SADC Moves Into Unknown Territory," 19 Agustus 1998. [Online]. Available: <http://www.ipsnews.net/1998/08/disarmament-sadc-moves-into-unknown-territory/>.
- [9] S. Baldauf, "DR Congo election: Kabila sworn in as rival challenges his legitimacy," 21 December 2011. [Online]. Available: <https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2011/1221/DR-Congo-election-Kabila-sworn-in-as-rival-challenges-his-legitimacy>.
- [10] UN, "Inter-Congolese Dialogue," 12 December 2002a. [Online]. Available: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CD_021216_Global%20and%20Inclusive%20Agreement%20on%20Transition%20in%20DRC.pdf.
- [11] UN, "Agreement between the governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Uganda on withdrawal of Ugandan troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, cooperation and normalisation of relations between two countries," 2002b. [Online]. Available: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CD%20UG_020906_Luanda%20Agreement.pdf.
- [12] Sugiyono, *Metode Penelitian Kuantitatif, Kualitatif dan R&D*, Bandung: Alfabeta, 2016.
- [13] I. Hasan, *Analisis Data Penelitian Dengan Statistik*, Jakarta: PT Bumi Aksara, 2004.
- [14] P. C. Earley and S. Ang, *Cultural Intelligence: Individual Interactions Across Cultures*, Redwood City: Stanford Business Books, 2003.

-
- [15] S. Ang, L. V. Dyne, C. Koh, K. Y. Ng, K. J. Templer, C. Tay and N. A. Chandrasekar, "Cultural Intelligence: Its Measurement and Effects on Cultural Judgment and Decision Making, Cultural Adaptation and Task Performance," *Management and Organization Review*, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 335-371, November 2007.
 - [16] J. H. Flavell, "Metacognition and cognitive monitoring: A new area of cognitive–developmental inquiry," *American Psychologist*, vol. 34, no. 10, p. 906–911, 1979.
 - [17] R. Brislin, R. Worthley and B. Macnab, "Cultural Intelligence: Understanding Behaviors that Serve People's Goals," *Group & Organization Management*, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 40-55, 1 February 2006.
 - [18] E. L. Deci and R. M. Ryan, *Intrinsic Motivation and Self-Determination in Human Behavior*, New York: Springer US, 1975.
 - [19] A. Bandura, "Social Cognitive Theory in Cultural Context," *Applied Psychology*, vol. 51, no. 2, pp. 269-290, 2005.
 - [20] W. B. Gudykunst, S. Ting-Toomey and E. Chua, *Culture and Interpersonal Communication*, New York: SAGE Publications, 1998.
 - [21] D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," *Econometrica*, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 263-292, March 1979.
 - [22] UNSCR, "Resolution 1258: The situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," 6 August 1999. [Online]. Available: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1258>.
 - [23] UN, "Security Council Extends Mandate for United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2612 (2021)," 20 December 2021. [Online]. Available: <https://press.un.org/en/2021/sc14743.doc.htm>.
 - [24] A. Novosseloff, "The Effectiveness of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," 19 December 2019. [Online]. Available: <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2019/12/effectiveness-un-mission-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/>.
 - [25] W. Mbokani, Interviewee, Why we're protesting against UN peacekeepers in DR Congo. [Interview]. 18 August 2022.
 - [26] C. Sengenya, "The New Humanitarian," Why we're protesting against UN peacekeepers in DR Congo, 18 August 2022. [Online]. Available: <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/2022/08/18/why-we-re-protesting-against-un-peacekeepers-dr-congo>. [Accessed 23 October 2022].
 - [27] C. Zawadi, Interviewee, MONUSCO came to secure us, but there is only insecurity. [Interview]. 18 August 2022.
 - [28] K. Y. Ng, R. Ramayana, T. M. Teo and S. F. Wong., "CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE : ITS POTENTIAL FOR MILITARY LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT," in 47th International Military testing Association, Singapore, 2005.
 - [29] J. B. Haseman, "Garuda XII: Indonesian Peacekeeping in Cambodia," *Joint Force Quarterly*, pp. 89-94, 1996.
-