The wargaming signalling paradox: when military publication precedes political miscalculation
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.37868/dss.v7.id307Abstract
This article examines how publishing wargaming results or military planning timelines creates institutional commitment traps leading to strategic miscalculation. Analysing Russia's 2013 Gerasimov article and China's October 2025 15th Five-Year Plan, we identify three paradoxes: publication signals confidence while reflecting overconfidence; aims to deter but constrains flexibility; and demonstrates rigour while omitting critical behavioural factors. China's 2027 PLA centenary deadline is particularly concerning, as Xi Jinping's legitimacy becomes tied to published timelines despite acknowledged wargaming limitations - the same blind spots that contributed to Russia's Ukraine disaster. Contemporary Chinese simulation research exhibits identical problems while claiming 90% success probability.
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Copyright (c) 2026 Branko Ruzic

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